


October 15, 1942

SOCIAL ACTION



**Uniting Today
for Tomorrow**

BY

GRAYSON KIRK and WALTER R. SHARP

SOCIAL ACTION

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
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THE UNITED NATIONS



Wartime Decisions and Peacetime Consequences

This issue of *Social Action* is the third¹ in a series prepared for the Congregational Christian Study of World Organization.

This study was initiated a year ago under the leadership of Professor Robert L. Calhoun of the Yale Divinity School. This year, the study center has been transferred to Oberlin College. This traditional center of Congregationalism will be the seed-bed of ideas and convictions upon the basis of which the members of our churches may devote themselves to the task of creating an orderly world.

The United Nations have become a reality—or at least, like the World Council of Churches, a reality “in process of formation.” *Uniting Today for Tomorrow* reflects this new world situation and studies its potentialities for good or ill.²

The war now being waged and the enduring peace for which we hope and work form one “seamless web.” The character of the coming world order is being determined *now*, by the decisions and agreements of the belligerent powers. We all know to what sadly insufficient results the wartime commitments of the Allied Powers added up, at the close of World War I. What is our present position, measured by that tragic yardstick? In some respects the United Nations are still far *less* united than were the Allies, while in other respects (notably the Master Lend-Lease Agreements) they have taken decisions which bode well for continuous collaboration in postwar re-

¹ *The Struggle for World Order*, by Vera Micheles Dean; *Christian Faith and World Order*, by Robert L. Calhoun.

² To be included in Second Study Packet in Series. The first packet, “American Churches and World Order,” is still available for groups starting their study. 35c.

construction. Churchmen must master the details of these momentous wartime agreements, if they are to make Christian ideals effectively influential in the coming peace. We must challenge decisions which may have evil peacetime consequences, encourage good decisions, correct dubious ones, and do it *now*. Only so will we fulfil our responsibility as Christian citizens.

WALTER M. HORTON
Director of Study Center

Introduction

Out of the titanic world struggle now going on, a unique kind of international coalition has been born. Bound by no formal treaty of alliance, the members of this mighty coalition include twenty-nine nations, each and all pledged to crush the Axis aggressors and to work together after victory for the establishment of a better world.

WHO ARE THE UNITED NATIONS?

In the city of Washington, on the first day of 1942, twenty-six signatures were affixed to a simple but momentous document called the *Joint Declaration by United Nations*. Heading the list were the names of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Maxim Litvinoff, and Tse Vung Soong, on behalf of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China, respectively. In alphabetical order, twenty-two other states adhered to the Declaration through their accredited representatives in Washington. The list is impressive:

Australia	Honduras
Belgium	India
Canada	Luxembourg
Costa Rica	Netherlands
Cuba	New Zealand
Czechoslovakia	Nicaragua
Dominican Republic	Norway
El Salvador	Panama
Greece	Poland
Guatemala	South Africa
Haiti	Yugoslavia

Six months later, two more nations—Mexico and the Philippines—entered the family of United Nations, swelling the

total to twenty-eight. And in August 1942, Brazil became the twenty-ninth.

In the language of the original Declaration, all nations "which are, or may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism" will find a welcome any time they care to join. Indeed, the United States government has gone even further: it has stated that, as the depository for the Declaration, it "will receive statements of adherence to its principles from appropriate authorities which are not governments." The day after the signing, the Danish Minister to Washington presented such a statement of adherence on behalf of his occupied country. The door is likewise left open to such movements as that of the Fighting French. For there is nothing exclusive about this world-wide association of peoples fighting for freedom.

Within the present membership are nine nations now subject to the conqueror's yoke. Eight of them (Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece, Poland and Czechoslovakia) are bravely carrying on by means of exiled but legal governments with headquarters in London. The ninth, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, functions through a provisional government recently set up in Washington by President Manuel Quezon. The remaining members include four British Dominions, India, eleven Latin American Republics, and the quartette of major powers upon whose shoulders the prosecution of the war against the Axis mainly rests.

Report has it that the term "United Nations" originated with the President of the United States. Seeking a name for the embattled forces of freedom which would emphasize *a union of peoples* rather than *an alliance of powers*, Mr. Roose-

velt again displayed his happy faculty for symbolizing a great idea in a simple but appealing phrase.

UNITED FOR WHAT?

By the terms of the Declaration, each signatory agrees to employ its full resources, military and economic, "against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war"—a wording carefully chosen to cover the fact that Russia was not yet fighting Japan. In the second place, the signers pledge themselves "not to make a separate armistice or peace" with their enemies.

But the Declaration of the United Nations represents something more than a pact for the waging of war in common. It is just as much a commitment to a common set of peace objectives. According to the preamble of the Declaration, the signatories subscribe to the "common program of purposes and principles" contained in the Atlantic Charter. In this way, the manifesto of peace aims originally issued at sea by the American President and the British Prime Minister, months before America's official entry into the war, became the official proclamation of all the nations fighting the Axis. The preamble further declares that "a complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands, as well as in other lands."

Here, in essence, we find expression of the "Four Freedoms" set forth by President Roosevelt a year earlier in his annual message to Congress—"freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear." Here, too, is evidence of the conviction that unless the forces of freedom can remain united for the hard tasks of peacemaking, the war will have been fought in vain.

THE SEAMLESS WEB OF WAR AND PEACE

The web of war and peace is a seamless one. The United Nations must translate the machinery for collective action while the fighting goes on into concrete arrangements for the development of a peaceful world order when the fighting is over. And if we are to work together in unity for postwar reconstruction, we must achieve thorough solidarity of purpose during the struggle itself.

It is therefore important that we make as many commitments as we can now to hold the United Nations together for the future as well as for the present. (As we shall see in later chapters, a number of such commitments have already been made.) We shall then have both a functioning international organization and the pledged adherence of many nations to it, or to sections of it. With a headstart like this, we ought to be able to offset any let-down of morale and collective will that may follow the war.

The Declaration of the United Nations is the foundation stone on which we can be building, even now, the future peace. It is something new in history. President Wilson's Fourteen Point program was not officially accepted by our allies in World War I until the Armistice (and then only with reservations). But the Declaration is a solemn engagement entered into by the entire community of nations fighting "the savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world." To realize the Eight Points of the Atlantic Charter becomes the *joint* goal of the democracies—a goal which ought to rule out secret treaties contrary in spirit, such as did so much to plague the peacemakers of 1919.



I. Some Echoes from World War I

Before sketching the cooperative war machinery now being forged by the United Nations, it may be well to shift our glance back a quarter of a century. The story of inter-Allied cooperation during World War I, and of how it was scrapped almost as soon as victory came, can teach us valuable lessons today. Insofar as possible, we must avoid the mistakes made last time, and at the same time make use of the successful features of the earlier experience.

INTER-ALLIED MILITARY COOPERATION, 1914-19

The Allied and Associated Powers in World War I did not easily or quickly achieve effective cooperation. War had ravaged Europe for almost a year before the Allied governments saw that they would have to scrap the old diplomacy if they were really going to pull together as a political team. In July 1915, the first of a series of meetings brought the heads of the British and French governments together to

discuss problems of general strategy. After some months of experimentation with special conferences of this type, it became clear that what was needed was a continuing organization. Accordingly, in January 1916, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, proposed to Aristide Briand, then French Premier, that a standing inter-Allied committee of prime ministers and certain of their ministerial colleagues and military advisers should be created, with a permanent secretariat to serve them. Mr. Asquith was thinking of a body like the British Committee of Imperial Defense, which had for twenty years advised the British Cabinet on the defense of the Empire, and on which the Dominion governments were from time to time represented by their own prime ministers.

At the outset, however, Mr. Asquith's proposal was adopted only in part. An inter-Allied committee *was* set up, but it was not given a permanent secretariat. Nor were the Allied ministers willing at first to admit professional military men into their conferences. Instead, the general staffs would ordinarily confer alone, and immediate afterwards the heads of governments would hold a separate meeting to consider the recommendations of their military advisers. From March 1916 until toward the end of 1917, this rather cumbersome procedure creaked at irregular intervals into motion.

THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL

In the meantime, the United States had entered the war. Dissatisfied with existing arrangements, President Wilson lent his active support to a British suggestion that a *Supreme War Council* be created to coordinate Allied strategy. In November, thirty-nine months after the first shot was fired, the British, French, and Italian Premiers agreed at Rapallo, Italy, to set up such a Council. It began at once to function. Its member-

ship consisted of two political representatives (one of them the prime minister) of each of the major European Allies, flanked by their respective chiefs of staff and a permanent secretariat. Until just before the Armistice, when Colonel House arrived in Europe as President Wilson's delegate, the United States had no regular political representation on the Council, but our General Bliss joined European staff officers in the discussions of military strategy.

The tasks of the Supreme War Council were (1) to supervise the general conduct of the war, (2) to prepare recommendations for the consideration of the Allied governments, (3) to keep itself informed of their execution, and (4) to report on results to the governments. Thus the Council served rather as a coordinating than as a directing agency with authority of its own. Its members had to iron out their differences of opinion by discussion and compromise. No government was legally bound to abide by any decision of the Council.

Because the military situation at the time was so serious, however, it was not hard to get agreement on a course of action. One of the first acts of the new Council was to set up an Inter-Allied General Staff. A few weeks later an Inter-Allied Naval Board was created.

ALLIED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Although these were steps in the right direction, there was still no unity of command in the field. Hitherto, it had been impossible to get the Allied governments to agree on an Allied commander-in-chief. Now, at last, there existed a joint agency by which a supreme commander could be appointed and to which he might be held responsible. Moreover, the weight of Woodrow Wilson's rapidly growing

influence in Allied councils began to make itself felt, and no statesman realized more clearly than the President the vital importance of setting up a unified command.

Thus it was that in March 1918, on the eve of the last major German offensive, the Supreme War Council placed General Ferdinand Foch in command of the Allied armies in France. Shortly afterwards, Foch was made Generalissimo of the Allied forces on all fronts, thereby becoming personally accountable for the conduct of field operations everywhere. Although taken distressingly late, this action set the stage for the smashing Allied triumph over the German armies in November 1918.

INTER-ALLIED ECONOMIC COOPERATION, 1914-19

Coordinating the economic and financial phases of the Allied war effort turned out to be just as difficult as unifying military command. For the first time in the history of modern war, vast supplies of raw materials, munitions, foodstuffs, clothing, and equipment had to be produced and transported from one hemisphere to the other. For this gigantic undertaking there was at best only a limited amount of shipping, and as the German submarine campaign reached its peak, more and more ships went to the bottom. Just as in the present struggle, though on a less spectacular scale, shipping was the bottleneck which limited the tempo and scope of Allied military operations.

Before the United States entered the war, Allied economic cooperation centered primarily in the country with the greatest productive resources and the greatest reserves of money and credit. This, of course, was Great Britain. As early as August 1914, an inter-Allied commission to pool the purchase and distribution of certain materials, notably sugar

and meats, was set up in London. Since most of the foreign buying depended upon British credits, this organization operated largely under British management, though its membership included representatives of various national purchasing departments. One of the chief tasks of the commission was to see that governments did not bid against one another for supplies in neutral countries.

SHIPPING DIFFICULTIES

As the war went on, the British government found it had to allocate more and more British shipping to France and Italy for transporting coal and other bulky commodities. Since there was no satisfactory inter-governmental machinery for this purpose, by January 1917 an *Inter-Allied Shipping Committee* was set up in London. Unfortunately, this Committee failed to function satisfactorily because "it included neither Ministers with power to speak on behalf of their several Governments on questions of policy, nor officials responsible for the current work of arranging ships and supplies." By the end of the year, what with the ravages of the German submarine blockade, it was clear that an organization with teeth in it would have to be created.

In November, an Allied economic conference met in Paris to consider the grave situation then threatening the Allied cause. For the first time, representatives of the American government joined those of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, China, and the lesser Allies in a round-table discussion of the interrelated problems of shipping and supply. Out of these talks grew a new agency, the *Allied Maritime Transport Council*, which had a permanent Executive to carry out its decisions.

This agency differed sharply from its predecessor in that


it consisted of national ministers responsible for the administration of war purchases and shipping in their own countries. The British, French, and Italian governments each appointed two ministers to the Council, while the United States sent as its principal delegate an ex-vice-chairman of the American Shipping Board. Attached to each of these "delegations" was a technical staff of officials that made up the respective "national divisions" of the Council's executive apparatus. In practice, the heads of these four divisions became the permanent executive committee of the Council, the British member, Sir Arthur Salter, playing the dual role of Chairman of the Executive and Secretary of the Council.

PROGRAM COMMITTEES

Around this central organization there grew up, as the need arose, a cluster of subsidiary boards to deal with specific commodities. For the most part, these were known as "program" committees whose function was to survey the import requirements of food, munitions, and raw materials. During 1918 the work of four of these committees, concerned with sugar, meats and fats, cereals, and oil seeds, was coordinated under an *Inter-Allied Food Council*. Seven others, on nitrates, aircraft, chemicals, explosives, non-ferrous metals, steel, and mechanical transport came together under an *Inter-Allied Munitions Council*. Nine additional committees, operating separately but having a general responsibility to the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, covered the following commodities:

wool	paper
cotton	timber
flax, hemp and jute	petroleum
hides and leather	coal and coke
tobacco	

ALLIED ORGANIZATION – 1918



Three subcommittees of the A.M.T.C. dealt with the special problems of allocating shipping, determining import needs, and collecting statistical data, while a fourth division was known as the chartering executive.

THE KEY POSITION OF THE A.M.T.C.

Broadly speaking, the Allied Maritime Transport Council exercised control over all these program committees because of its power to allocate or withhold cargo space. Inevitably, therefore, the Council became the pivot of the entire cooperative machinery through which the Allied and Associated Powers mobilized their economic resources for the final phase of the war. Although the Council itself met only four times before the Armistice, its executive staffs were in constant touch, by telephone or cable, with their parent departments in London, Paris, Rome, and Washington. From the Council's headquarters, day after day, flowed decisions which vitally influenced the national economies of a score or more of countries around the globe. Before the war ended, ninety per cent of the seagoing tonnage of the world was subject to orders of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in London. Vast shipments of wheat from Canada, of wool and meat from Australia, of cotton from Egypt, and of ammunition from the United States, were so scheduled as to minimize the amount of cargo space needed to move them from producer to user. Probably the most signal success of this inter-Allied organization lay in assembling the enormous tonnage required for the transport of 2,000,000 American troops to France and later for keeping them supplied.

A quick glance at the accompanying diagram will help the reader to visualize the far-flung system of economic administration which gradually took shape, largely by trial and error,

before the war ended. Space will not permit us to describe the many ramifications of the system. Suffice it to say that the problem of money proved far less difficult than the problem of how to stretch limited supplies of war material and shipping facilities. The two agencies indicated at the left of the diagram, the *War Purchase and Financial Council* and the *Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement* (C.I.R.), allocated funds for war orders in the United States and in Great Britain respectively. On the continent of Europe, an *Allied Transportation Council* supervised the operation of national railway facilities for both civil and military purposes, while an *Allied Blockade Council* devoted itself to the economic encirclement of Germany by land and sea.

A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT

Viewed as a whole, the economic organization of the Allies during World War I was a remarkable experiment in international administration. It showed that separate national policies *can* be translated into vigorous international action when there is sufficient unity of will to do so. This was done, moreover, without setting up some authority *above* the separate nations. It was done by bringing national officials responsible for certain fields of work into direct contact with one another *across* national lines. Shipping officials of one country, for example, worked with shipping officials of the other countries, economists worked with other economists, food ministers with other food ministers, and treasury men with other treasury men.

Writing after the war of the work of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, Sir Arthur Salter tells us how "each minister would, in his national capacity, issue the executive orders required to give effect to the recommendation to which

he had assented, in his international capacity, as a member of the Council." When the members of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in London argued current problems with their colleagues, it was natural that they should present the point of view of their own countries. Once they had agreed on a common policy, however, they went home to argue the Allied point of view and urge the appropriate national authorities to carry it out. And they could agree on common policies because they thrashed them out stage by stage with men who spoke the same professional, if not the same actual, language, men with whom their professional association day after day soon changed into warm personal friendship. This continuous contact of national administrators on the inter-Allied level had a profound effect on national administrations all the way down the line.



II. Retrogression

When the "Cease-fire!" sounded in November 1918, plans were under way to strengthen the inter-Allied system of economic collaboration at those points where it still remained weak or inadequate. And many people, looking ahead to the tasks of the postwar period, were suggesting that some of the wartime controls should be adapted to the economic requirements of peace.

PROPOSALS FOR PEACETIME COOPERATION

As early as June 1916, the French government had proposed to its European allies that they plan joint shipping, raw materials, and trade policies after the war. What the French had in mind was some sort of economic alliance of the victors against the defeated powers. Although supported by Italy, the French proposals smacked too much of vengeful discrimination to win British favor.

Following the formation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, France advanced a less ambitious plan. This was a scheme for the international regulation of stocks of essential raw materials. The French were afraid that there would be shortages of many of the basic commodities they were obliged to import, and that they would have to pay exorbitant prices because of competitive bidding in an unregulated world market. Notwithstanding the force of this argument, both London and Washington turned a deaf ear to the second French proposal.

With the coming of the Armistice, Europe faced disease, famine, and widespread disorder, if not revolution, unless the victor states quickly put drastic relief and sanitary measures into effect. Once again, the French government urged the Allies to maintain at least a temporary control over the distribution of basic raw materials and foodstuffs. Each country, the French insisted, should be assured of a minimum quantity of commodities at reasonable prices. And means of transporting these materials to the consuming areas should also be provided. At about the same time, British labor leaders came forward with a broad program of economic reconstruction based upon continuing international control. The Foreign Office gave its blessing to this program, and the British government thereupon announced its approval of the French proposals, provided that the United States would also support them.

UNCLE SAM TURNS A DEAF EAR

Unfortunately, this country had already shown signs of an adverse attitude. Mr. Herbert Hoover, then United States Food Administrator, advised President Wilson that it would not be in the interest of American exporters to have the prices

of their products fixed by agencies on which foreign representatives would have the deciding votes. The President appears to have yielded to this advice, for Hoover cabled London shortly afterwards that the United States could not "agree to any program that even looks like inter-Allied control of our economic resources after peace."

Undaunted, the French Minister of Commerce, representing his government on the Economic Drafting Commission of the Peace Conference, once more took up the cudgels for a raw materials control program. Mr. Bernard Baruch, American representative on this Commission, then declared his categorical opposition to any system of international economic regulation. First of all, he said, setting up such a system would lead to an "economic war" against Germany; second, it was unnecessary because there would probably be no serious shortages of raw materials; and finally, it would require legislative authorization from the American Congress, which had already registered its disapproval. Since the French proposal obviously would not work without American participation, it was shelved.

THE CLOCK OF COLLABORATION RUNS DOWN

Meanwhile, many of the inter-Allied wartime control agencies were dismantled completely, only a few being absorbed into a provisional organization for administering European relief. The Allied Maritime Transport Council held only two meetings after the Armistice, and by April 1919, it had ceased to exist. At President Wilson's suggestion, a *Supreme Economic Council* was set up in Paris in February to coordinate relief operations. Of its seven sections, the most active was that on food and relief, directed by Mr. Hoover himself. The shipping section of this Council took over what

was left of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive. Not only had the new Council no real executive power, but it had no funds of its own either. Its work was therefore limited mainly to handing out the funds voted by various Allied governments for specific relief purposes.

Through the raw materials section of the Supreme Economic Council the French and Italian delegates made a final effort to persuade the Allied governments to continue joint purchases of raw materials. But when the British representative, Lord Robert Cecil, openly joined the American delegate in opposing this action, the whole idea had to be abandoned. British opposition was chiefly due to pressure from the Dominions, which were as little inclined as the United States to enter any system likely to restrict their freedom of commerce in the years ahead.

While all this was going on in Paris, the Allied Powers proceeded to "decontrol" shipping. At the same time, the United States and Great Britain wound up their financial arrangements for supplying coal and foodstuffs to France. Shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, America withdrew altogether from the Supreme Economic Council. Now exclusively European, the Council continued to function as a modest advisory body until early in 1920, when it quietly gave up the ghost.

FRICITION AMONG "FRIENDS"

Inter-Allied collaboration fared little better in political and military matters than in the economic field. Difficulties arose even over the Armistice negotiations. Since the Supreme War Council existed only to plan war strategy, there was no political agency with authority to speak for all the powers at war with Germany. The Allies therefore hastily improvised a

procedure for making armistice arrangements—a procedure which led to considerable friction between President Wilson and the European Allies in handling correspondence with the German government. An informal council consisting of representatives of the “Big Four,” together with a Japanese and a Belgian delegate, made final decisions as to the Armistice terms.

It was this body (minus the Belgian delegate) that made arrangements for the Paris Peace Conference and set up its internal organization. It also threshed out in secret the ill-starred provisions of the treaty settlement. Throughout the period of the Conference, moreover, it served as an emergency international authority for those portions of Europe torn by revolution or harassed by famine and disease.

“CONTINUATION” BODIES

After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919; the Supreme War Council sat continuously in Paris under the presidency of the French Premier, Clemenceau. Early the next year most of its executive work was taken over by a subordinate body, known as the *Conference of Ambassadors* because it consisted of the British, Italian, Japanese and American ambassadors in Paris, usually with the French Premier as chairman. By 1921, since the American Senate had refused to ratify the peace treaties, the Wilson Administration had withdrawn our representatives, one after another, from the various inter-Allied agencies created for the purpose of adjusting problems left up in the air by the treaty settlement. Thus Americans dropped out of “continuation” bodies like the *Reparations Commission*, the *Rhineland High Commission*, and the *Inter-Allied Military and Naval Commissions of Control*. A disillusioned America was washing

her hands of a sick Europe. When this country thus disclaimed any further responsibility in the peace settlement, it paved the way for the quarrel between Britain and France which came to a head over the reparations issue in 1923.

THE HARD LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE

As we look back with the advantage of hindsight, we can see that failure to mould the inter-Allied wartime organization to fit the needs of postwar reconstruction was a costly blunder. Once this cooperative machinery had broken down, it turned out to be impossible to forge unity of will again among the victors. The urge to act together which had been imperative in the face of immediate danger faded out when the danger had passed.

In the case of the two great English-speaking democracies, shortsighted economic self-interest was what blocked the way. It stopped every attempt to maintain a system of planned control which might have assured adequate shipping facilities and access to essential raw materials, at fair prices, for the legitimate needs of all peoples. Similarly, it prevented the kind of continuous collaboration by Washington, London, and Paris which could probably soon have adjusted the staggering burden of international indebtedness left by the war—German reparations on the one hand and the Allied war debts on the other.

Instead, these powers chose to travel the illusory path of economic nationalism, the United States and France leading the way and Britain reluctantly and belatedly following their example. National tariff barriers rose steeply on all sides; wild inflation wiped out the savings of millions of Germans and discredited the Weimar Republic in their eyes; the same kind of thing happened in many of the smaller states of

Central and Eastern Europe; and America indulged in an orgy of speculative investment which eventually cracked up in the most disastrous economic depression of all time.

Efforts to cope with the ills of the world were at best half-hearted. The League of Nations, crippled from birth by our refusal to support it, nibbled as best it could at the problem of economic recovery, but it had not authority enough to stop the forces of collapse. In 1933, a World Economic Conference met in London to try and work out an international agreement for all-round tariff reduction and currency stabilization. Whether this Conference could have succeeded or not is an open question. But President Roosevelt apparently believed that any currency agreement it might make would interfere with his plans for domestic recovery. He therefore notified the Conference that the United States government would not join in any stabilization scheme.

CONFUSION WORSE CONFOUNDED

As economic deadlock persisted, international political relations went rapidly from bad to worse. Because it lacked American support and could not count on any clear-cut British commitment to help in maintaining European security, the League of Nations was unable to set up an international system of arms limitation and inspection which might have prevented German rearmament under Hitler. Weary of war and militarism, the Western democracies yielded to the illusion that they could have peace merely by wishing for it. They wrote their wishes into a series of well-meaning but toothless anti-war pacts. For its part, the United States refused even to collaborate in the work of the Permanent Court of International Justice, although Americans served as judges in their individual capacities.

When, in 1931, the Japanese warlords threw down the challenge to the West by invading Manchuria, Britain and America lamely "passed the buck" to one another. Both powers invoked the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact and the Nine Power Treaty against Japan, but neither was willing to use its economic or naval strength to check Japanese aggression. Japan's success in flouting the world encouraged Benito Mussolini to believe that he, too, could blithely follow the path of empire. This he did four years later in Ethiopia.

THE AXIS CHALLENGE

World politics now degenerated into a new struggle for power which was to culminate in the war of 1939. No sooner had Adolf Hitler and his Nazis gained control of the German state than they proceeded to throw overboard the hated *Diktat* of Versailles. This they accomplished by taking advantage of every democratic weakness and vacillation. The free world knows to its horror how the German Führer mixed high-powered propaganda with diplomatic blackmail to end the armaments restrictions imposed upon the Reich by the Treaty of Versailles; to fortify the Rhineland; to annex Austria; to dismember Czechoslovakia at Munich; and finally, in March 1939, to march into Prague. Together with Mussolini's Italy, which had become Germany's Axis partner, the Third Reich had turned the Spanish Civil War into a rehearsal for the larger struggle that lay ahead, and the Spanish Republicans became the tragic victims of a farcical "non-intervention" agreement which Britain and France uneasily sponsored.

APPEASEMENT DAYS

Throughout these fateful years, the chancelleries of London and Paris vainly hoped to appease the fascist dictators by

retreating before each new threat. On both sides of the Channel, the forces of appeasement, capitalizing on the war-weariness of the common people, were able to control the main lines of official policy. Neville Chamberlain came home from Munich honestly believing that he had won "peace in our time." Edouard Daladier, his French associate in "the crime of Czechoslovakia," was cheered by a grateful throng of Parisians when he stepped from his airplane at Le Bourget airport. Neither the French nor the British people yet realized the full import of what their leaders had allowed to happen. The American people, who were interested spectators and armchair critics, were not any more enlightened. Nor did any one then foresee how Soviet Russia's exclusion from the Munich negotiations would weaken her confidence in the later efforts of Britain and France to improvise a "stop Hitler" front.

INTO THE ABYSS

Not only did this belated shift of London and Paris from an appeasement to an anti-aggression policy fail to win the small democracies of Europe back to their former faith in collective security, but the Soviet-Nazi non-aggression pact of August 1939 practically nullified its effects. Thanks to this master-stroke of Nazi diplomacy, Hitler rid himself, at least temporarily, of the nightmare of a "two-front" war. Still thinking, apparently, that the British and French would not fight when the showdown came, the Nazi government soon took over Danzig and sent a humiliating ultimatum to Poland.

The die was now cast. The two democratic powers had pledged themselves to come to Poland's aid. Reluctantly, they acted on this pledge by declaring war upon Hitler. Within three weeks, before Britain and France could begin to organize

effective aid, a Nazi *Blitzkrieg* had laid Poland waste. Britain and France then prepared themselves for a long war of blockade and attrition patterned on the experience of 1914-18.



III. In the Face of Danger

To explain in detail the reasons for the disasters that followed the so-called "phoney" stage of the war in the West is not within the scope of this Headline Book. Looking backward, we know that a telling factor was Hitler's six years' head start in gearing German economy for war. Another was the failure of the French and British general staffs to take into account the changes which had revolutionized military science since World War I. Neither in the air nor on the ground were the Anglo-French forces prepared to cope with the new type of mechanized operations that swept the German armies like lightning through the Low Countries and France. They had far too little motorized equipment and their strategy was hopelessly out of date. Moreover, the French army of 1940 did not have behind it, like the French army of 1914-18, a resolute, united nation. And until Winston Churchill galvanized their spirit after Dunkerque, the British people, too, were far from vigorous in their war effort.

THE PERFECT PARTNERSHIP—ON PAPER

Paradoxically enough, despite its disastrous record, the formal organization of the Anglo-French alliance had reached, at least on paper, a much more closely knit stage by the time of the French collapse of 1940 than was the case with the European Allies during the first two years of World War I. In less than a month after the Nazi invasion of Poland, the two democracies created a *Supreme War Council* and a unified command both on land and on sea. By November 1939, they had forged a common economic front, and a month later they signed a far-reaching monetary agreement providing for the interchange of their currencies at a fixed ratio, so as to avoid having to ship gold to settle their accounts with one another. In London seven joint executive agencies were set up to deal with aviation problems, munitions, war materials, oil, food, shipping, and economic warfare respectively. Each of these agencies was staffed by an equal number of British and French officials. To settle disputes about priorities of materials and other matters, there was an over-all coordinating committee. The two Allies further agreed that they would share war expenses common to both in the ratio of three to two—Britain, because of her greater resources, bearing the larger share.

Only a few days before the Germans invaded Denmark and Norway, the Supreme War Council announced to the world that the United Kingdom and the French Republic were resolved not only to make no separate peace, but also to "maintain after conclusion of peace a community of action in all spheres for so long as may be necessary to safeguard their security and to effect the reconstruction, with the assistance of other nations, of an international order which will ensure the liberty of peoples, respect for law and the main-

tenance of peace in Europe." Following the tragic chain of events during the next two months, one of the partners to this pledge—whether avoidably or not will long remain a matter of dispute—surrendered to a triumphant Germany and passed out of the war.

A MARRIAGE PROPOSAL WHICH CAME TOO LATE

Just before the French Cabinet at Bordeaux decided by a sharply divided vote to ask for an armistice, the Churchill government dramatically offered to conclude "a solemn Act of Union between the two countries." One of the most daring political moves in all international history, this proposal called for setting up "joint organs of defense, foreign, financial, and economic policies." Every citizen of the one country would become a citizen of the other. A single war Cabinet would direct all the forces of Britain and France. Finally the plan looked to a formal association of the two Parliaments. Unparalleled for the generosity of its terms, this offer, alas! came at a time when France had already lost control of her own destiny. Instead of free union with her fighting ally, forced "collaboration" with the Nazi conqueror became her fate, and a beleaguered Britain stood alone against the Nazi juggernaut.

Then it was, in a supreme moment of British destiny, that Winston Churchill appealed to his fellow-countrymen so to bear themselves that "if the British Commonwealth and Empire lasts for a thousand years men will still say, 'This was their finest hour'." How magnificently the men and women of England responded to this appeal is an epic of bravery and endurance which freedom-loving peoples everywhere will long remember. Aided only by a limited supply of war materials from the United States, and small contingents

of troops and air pilots from her Dominions, Britain held the fort alone against Goering's *Luftwaffe* until Adolf Hitler's legions invaded Soviet Russia on June 22, 1941.

AMERICAN AID—SHORT OF WAR

Meanwhile, the conflict was inexorably moving closer and closer to America. American aid to Britain, "short of war," entered a new phase with the passage of our Lend-Lease Act in March 1941, details of which we shall discuss in the next chapter. By taking this momentous step, the United States served notice upon the Axis powers that it had a vital stake in the world struggle for freedom. As "the arsenal of democracy," it rapidly cast aside the last vestiges of its "neutrality" policy—short of actually declaring war. It convoyed ships across the Atlantic; it "froze" German and Italian assets within its borders; it closed Axis consulates and propaganda organizations. President Roosevelt launched his "Atlantic Doctrine" of hemisphere defense by arranging with the appropriate authorities for American occupation of Greenland and Iceland. All these moves showed a clear realization that the island of Great Britain formed a vital outpost for our protection against Nazi aggression.

During the summer and fall of 1941, the sweep of the Axis challenge moved rapidly eastward. Ever since the Tripartite Pact of September 1940, Japan had to all intents and purposes been a partner in Axis plans for dominating the world. The Pact's purpose clearly was to haunt America with the specter of a "two-ocean" war long before our two-ocean navy could be built. If the United States entered the war in Europe, it would face a war in the Pacific as well.

Soon after the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia, Japan forced the Vichy government to allow her troops to occupy French

Indo-China. Washington now joined London in freezing Japanese assets in Britain and the United States. This stopped practically all British and American shipments of raw materials (including oil) to the Empire of the Rising Sun. Yet, despite our increasingly firm stand against Japanese military expansion, it was to take an openly hostile act on Japan's part to shatter our lingering hope that somehow or other we could escape war itself.

WAR MAKES AMERICA A FULL PARTNER

Pearl Harbor made Japan's intentions clear with shocking suddenness. For the first time since the war of 1812, American territory was directly attacked by an overseas power—a power which treacherously screened its aggressive intentions by continuing diplomatic negotiations up to and beyond the very minute bombs began to rain down on Hawaii.

Here was the answer to America's isolationists. For years they had preached that this country could maintain itself in safety behind its ocean barriers. Now war was thrust upon the nation simultaneously by three non-American powers, as part of a grandiose scheme of world aggression. America had no choice but to fight back, or lose her national identity and way of life. Most isolationists conceded this. But when the war is over and the shock of the Pearl Harbor tragedy has faded into the mists of memory, some of them may yet revert to their former illusion—the illusion that America can live untouched by events and ideologies in the rest of the world.

Washington now became a principal center of operations against the Axis. As the belligerent with the greatest economic resources, still largely untapped, the United States inevitably moved into a position of war leadership on an equal plane

with the British Commonwealth. It was in this new setting that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill worked out the United Nations' Declaration of January 1, 1942.



IV. The United Nations Mobilize Their Resources

Waging war costs money. Though the Nazis have shown that money and credit can be far less important to a nation's war effort than its will and productive capacity, nevertheless some kind of financing, whether orthodox or unorthodox, is needed to set the productive machinery in motion. Among the United Nations, the countries with the greatest financial resources must bear most of the immediate cost of the armaments needed by all. These countries are Great Britain and the United States.

WHO WILL FOOT THE FINAL BILL?

Where credit is given across national lines, however, there still remains the question of ultimate repayment. We in the United States can let our debtors send us goods and services, and repay us with the dollars they are thus able to earn. But there will be a great outcry from American business about foreign competition, and American workers in some lines of

work will lose their jobs. We can take gold in part repayment, bury it in Kentucky, as we did after the last war, and then lament the shrinking of our foreign markets because they no longer have gold enough to settle large international trade accounts. Or we can sit tight in the face of defaulting debtors, as we also did after the last war, demanding repayment to the last dollar without offering any suggestion as to how to repay and at the same time avoid stalling the machinery of world commerce. When payment is not forthcoming, we can proclaim bitterly, as many isolationists have done, that here is one more reason for keeping out of "foreign entanglements."

FROM EACH ACCORDING TO ABILITY TO PAY

Or lastly, we can regard our outlays as an American contribution to the joint war effort, in the success of which we, as well as our allies, have a life-and-death stake. We can accept the theory that our responsibility should be in proportion to our population and resources. In that case we shall not look for a complete settlement in dollars and cents, especially since this would not be possible anyway without interfering with our own and world economic recovery after the war. This last attitude, as we shall see, seems to be the one the United States government is adopting in its current financial dealings with the other United Nations.

WANTED—AMERICAN DOLLARS

Long before the United States entered the war, the British government and the other anti-Axis states began to have difficulty in collecting enough dollar exchange for all the war purchases they had to make in this country. Since they were not able to keep up their exports to us on the old scale,

the only way they could get dollars in sizable amounts was by taking over American securities held by their citizens, and selling them on the New York market. Yet still these governments hadn't enough dollars, and American business began to fear that such large security sales would cause the value of stocks and bonds to slump.

When the British had scraped the bottom of this financial barrel, they were faced with a dilemma. They must either curtail their war effort or, somehow, obtain dollar credits in this country. But the Neutrality Act and the Johnson Act stood in the way of the second step. The first of these forbade loans to belligerent governments, and the second forbade them to governments which had defaulted on their former war debts to us.

Nevertheless, the American people were displaying a growing sympathy with the British people in their dark hour. The American people did not want to have to go to war themselves, but they also did not want to hamper the British in their war effort. They were not neutral, despite the Neutrality Act. And there was a general feeling that the old war debt controversy ought not to be dragged out again, but that some new method of giving aid should be found.

LEND-LEASE

This new solution was, of course, the now familiar device of *Lend-Lease*, which was authorized by Congress in March 1941 after a lengthy debate. The President was empowered to transfer war equipment, foodstuffs or, in fact, almost anything of importance in the waging of a total war to any country whose defense was considered vital to our defense. The United States was to pay for these "defense articles" either directly through Congressional appropriation, or indi-

rectly through legislative authorization to transfer to other countries some of the funds already appropriated for our own defense services. The other countries might return unused supplies to the United States after the war, but the Act specified that we would accept "*payment or repayment in kind or property or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.*"

A NEW KIND OF DEBT SETTLEMENT

Within the framework of this broad grant of discretionary power, the United States has concluded a number of "master" agreements with countries which have received lend-lease aid. These agreements, now signed by twenty-two governments, lay down that the terms of repayment—specifically, "the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States"—

"shall be such as not to burden commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action . . . open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers . . ."

Obviously, there is no room here for a strict dollars-and-cents settlement. Far more important to the United States and the co-signers is the agreement to work together for economic prosperity the world over.

HOW A COUNTRY GETS LEND-LEASE AID

Lend-lease administration is necessarily somewhat complicated, and some critics have felt that office routine wastes too much valuable time. Foreign applications for aid go first to the *Office of Lend-Lease Administration*, which decides whether or not the request falls within the terms of the original act. Second, all the government agencies and the joint international boards concerned must approve the request. This is necessary because, otherwise, granting extensive aid might interfere with the execution of over-all production and distribution programs. When the various planning agencies, including the Board of Economic Warfare, have satisfied themselves that the request is legitimate and urgent, and that it can be fitted into the war program, the Lend-Lease Office issues orders to appropriate government procurement agencies, which then let the contracts to the producers.

Finally, there has to be some supervision of the distribution of lend-lease goods abroad. Missions operating under the Washington office have been sent to London, to Australia, to the Middle East (Egypt), to the Persian Gulf area (Iraq and Iran), to China, and to Russia. These missions have many tasks. They do all they can to speed the flow of lend-lease goods to the proper destinations, they supervise the setting up of guns, tanks and planes, and they instruct foreign personnel in their use. The mission to China has helped combat malaria, while in Iran Americans have cooperated with the British in improving the port, railway, and highway facilities necessary for moving supplies to Russia.

In return for this assistance, which by August 1942 had amounted to nearly six billion dollars, the receiving countries have contributed as much as they could to aid the American

war effort. They have ironed out currency difficulties connected with the needs of American expeditionary forces. They have placed local facilities—sites, shops, food supplies and so on—freely at our disposal. Australian and New Zealand lend-lease aid to our forces in the Southwest Pacific compares in volume with our lend-lease aid to Australia and New Zealand. We have British barrage balloons in the skies over our west coast and British anti-aircraft guarding our east coast, all without any dollars changing hands. British corvettes have joined our anti-submarine patrol in American waters, and we have even received, cash-free, an entire gun factory which was dismantled in England, shipped across the Atlantic in crates, and set up on American soil to turn out a crack type of gun for United States troops. Britain has also freely shared her war inventions with us. As the United Nations' war effort expands, there will probably be more and more of this exchange of goods and services.

INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR WAR PRODUCTION

Making strategic plans in widely separated combat areas hang together as a whole depends for its success first of all on making production and transportation programs hang together. In no previous war in human history has this dependence upon mechanization been so great. Never before has planning—and global planning—been so essential to victory.

The United States, the British Empire, and Russia must supply the bulk of the fabricated tools of war to all the anti-Axis forces everywhere. Russia has filled a portion of China's war needs, but otherwise all her productive energies have been absorbed in the gigantic task of resisting the Nazi onslaught, and she herself has been in need of weapons from America and Britain. The main burden of supply, therefore,

has fallen upon the United States and the British Empire. At every stage of the supply process these partners in arms must work together.

BRITISH-AMERICAN MACHINERY OF COOPERATION

A glance at the accompanying chart will show how close-knit and complete British-American collaboration in the economic field has already become. It functions through machinery similar to that which had been built up by the end of the last war (see Chapter I). That is to say, officials appointed to handle a certain problem within one country meet and confer with officials working on the same problem in the other country.

For example, the *Combined Raw Materials Board* consists of William Batt, of the United States War Production Board, and Sir Clive Baillieu, of the British Raw Materials Mission. In addition to a small secretariat with British and American sections, this Board has an operating committee which likewise is made up of men who are concerned in their national capacities with the raw materials problem: representatives of the British Embassy, the Board of Economic Warfare, the State Department, the Metals Reserve Company (a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation) and the War Production Board Requirements Committee.

As the name suggests, the Board's task is to plan "the best and speediest development, expansion and use of the raw material resources under the jurisdiction of the two governments." It has made world-wide allocations of tin, rubber, manila fiber (for heavy-duty rope), copper and many other needed materials the supply of which has been cut off by enemy action, or stocks of which are inadequate to meet the tremendous demands of war production.


A subcommittee of the Combined Raw Materials Board Operating Committee, called the *Export Markets Committee*, concentrates solely on the problem of Latin American trade. Its chief job is to see that Great Britain and the United States do not duplicate their exports of goods to the Latin American countries.

Following a similar pattern, the *Combined Food Board* consists of our Secretary of Agriculture Wickard and Robert Brand, the head of the British Food Mission in Washington. This Board acts upon the recommendations of the Food Requirements Committee of the War Production Board and the British Food Mission. In addition to planning the production, transportation and distribution of food wherever it is a matter of common concern to the two countries, the Combined Food Board is empowered to work with others of the United Nations for the development and most effective use of their food resources.

THE WORLD-WIDE WHEAT PROBLEM

Wheat, however, was such a world-wide food problem that it could not be dealt with by an exclusively British-American body. Even before the outbreak of the war, there had been attempts to reach international agreements on wheat, and a preparatory committee was drafting a report on the wheat problem when the bombs first fell on Poland. War halted its work, but in July 1941, officials of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States met in Washington, and ultimately set up an *International Wheat Council*, consisting of representatives of the five countries. This was to function until such time as a world-wide wheat conference could be held. In the meantime, the four chief producers also agreed to control production so as to avoid

JOINT PLANNING — SUPPLY



accumulating excessive wheat stocks during the war, and to create a wheat pool for inter-governmental relief in needy areas after the war. Price stabilization for wheat was likewise agreed upon.

MANAGING THE PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS

While supplies of food and raw materials are important, the really crucial problem is the manufacture of weapons of war. Here the over-all management is in the hands of Donald Nelson, for the United States, and Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production, who head a *Combined Production and Resources Board*. Their chief task is to work out a division of labor between the two countries which will make the smallest possible demands on shipping and at the same time keep the war production program at a maximum of efficiency.

Supplementing the work of this Board are two agencies dealing with particularly important branches of military supply: the *Joint Aircraft Committee* and the *Munitions Adjustment Board*. The first plots aircraft production, determines the types to be built, and allocates the finished planes to the various theaters of war. The second handles distribution of the munitions manufactured in the United States and Great Britain to the other United Nations. It has branches in both London and Washington, each with three American and three British representatives, who must keep in close touch with our Lend-Lease Office, with various British agencies, and with the China Defense Supplies organization. When munitions are to go to other countries under lend-lease, it is this Board rather than the Lend-Lease Office which makes the actual allocations, after the latter has given general approval.

AGENCIES FOR SPECIAL AREAS

Besides these boards which deal with over-all production and supply, there are a cluster of international agencies of varying importance which supplement their work. The United States and Canada, for example, joined hands in two groups of committees for the purpose of harmonizing their war effort. The first of these, the *Materials Coordinating Committees*, presents Canadian needs to the Requirements Committee of the U. S. War Production Board, and the W. P. B. in turn presents joint U. S.-Canadian requirements to the Combined Raw Materials Board. The second, the *Joint War Production Committees*, surveys the productive capacity of both countries and makes recommendations to the government agencies concerned for using it in the most efficient way.

INTER-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS

There are also certain inter-American organizations whose activities bear upon war production needs. The *Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee*, created before any American state was in the war and composed of one representative from each republic, is not primarily a war organization. But because the United States, the key power in the economy of the whole hemisphere, is at war, most of the Committee's work thus far has had to do with war production. Similarly, the *Inter-American Development Commission*, set up to further economic progress in the hemisphere as a whole, must work in relation to war needs today and with a view to postwar reconstruction tomorrow. The *Inter-American Coffee Board* wrestles with the problem of securing cargo space for the commodity which is so important a source of income for practically all the tropical countries of Latin America.

THE MIDDLE AND FAR EAST

Outside of this hemisphere, the anti-Axis governments have had to look to civilian as well as military supply in certain special areas. The *Middle Eastern Supply Center*, a British government buying organization, arranges for the importation of foodstuffs and other necessities into all the Middle Eastern countries, whose trade was disorganized by the closing of the Mediterranean and the shipping shortage. The *Eastern Group Supply Council*, representing Great Britain, India, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the British African Colonies and the Netherlands, does the same service for the Eastern countries from headquarters in New Delhi, India. Each organization has an American observer. An *Allied Supply Council*, consisting of American and Australian representatives, collects data on Australian sources of supply which the two nations can exploit for their war needs.

TRANSPORTATION CONTROL

Producing raw materials, food, weapons and munitions in sufficient quantities and allocating them on paper is only half the battle for the United Nations. The other half is getting the supplies to their destinations—in other words, the problem of shipping.

Again, the burden of solving the problem falls chiefly on the two big shipowners and ship-producers, the United States and Great Britain. A *Combined Military Transportation Committee* gears American-British military transport into a master plan. Coordinating all merchant shipping under the control of the two countries is the job of a *Combined Shipping Adjustment Board*. This Board has two branches, one in Washington and one in London. The Washington branch is under Rear Admiral Land, chairman of the U. S. War

Shipping Administration, and Sir Arthur Salter, who headed the Allied Maritime Transport Executive during the First World War. Here again we see men of similar professional interests and experience working together on a problem affecting their two countries. Lord Leathers, for Britain, and W. Averill Harriman, for the United States, direct the London branch. Since each country has its own shipping control agency—the War Shipping Administration in the United States and the Ministry of War Transport in Britain—the task of the Combined Board is to adjust the two shipping schedules so that they do not overlap or conflict. Indirectly, the Board's authority goes beyond those ships which fly the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes, because the other United Nations which have merchant fleets have asked this agency to direct their ships' movements too.

WEATHER IS INTERNATIONAL

Since far-reaching weather information is essential for planning both air and sea transport efficiently, Great Britain and the United States are now pooling their experts' weather observations with a *Combined Meteorological Committee*. The results of this Committee's work are, for obvious reasons, a military secret.

ECONOMIC WARFARE

Lastly, in the picture of the United Nations' gigantic effort at economic collaboration for war, we must include the machinery for economic warfare. This is directed, not at amassing or distributing war materials for ourselves, but at preventing the enemy from getting them. An American-British blockade committee, with headquarters in London, has representatives from our Board of Economic Warfare and

from our London Embassy, who try to forestall or prevent Axis buying in neutral countries, or shipments to Germany, Italy or Japan. A committee on blacklisting operates in Washington: its British branch, however, has full responsibility for Europe, where it initiates boycotts of business firms dealing directly or indirectly with the Axis, while the United States branch does the same in the Western Hemisphere.

Two facts stand out very clearly from this picture of all the international committees and boards which war needs have called forth. One is that not one committee or board is a real *United Nations* body, with representatives from all twenty-nine nations. The other is that all the agencies are concentrating almost exclusively on winning the war rather than planning for the peace.

POSTWAR ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS

One international organization, however, is concerned exclusively with postwar economic affairs. Though not established on a full United Nations basis yet, it has a wider representation than any of the other agencies we have mentioned. This is the *Inter-Allied Committee on Postwar Requirements*, set up by the eight guest governments in London (see page 8) to accumulate stockpiles of commodities for the relief and rehabilitation of their respective countries after the war. The British and American governments are both cooperating with this committee. For both realize that such food reserves have a real propaganda value in the occupied countries, and both are concerned that the stockpiles should not become so large as to interfere with the war effort.



V. Wanted—a Supreme Strategist

We have seen that, although it is not yet operating under general United Nations control, an impressive collection of machinery for economic collaboration is serving the United Nations' war effort. Unhappily we cannot point to any such impressive collaboration in the military sphere.

An American official recently remarked in a moment of irritation that he longer had any great admiration for Napoleon's military genius, because the foes he defeated consisted of a coalition. This man was voicing the fundamental difficulty of the United Nations in planning their military strategy. In Axis Europe, Hitler is supreme, even over his allies, and all military planning emanates from Berlin. But the United Nations have somehow to find among themselves agreement on a grand strategy into which their various independent national energies and resources can be geared.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF WAGING COOPERATIVE WAR

This is no easy task. Hitherto sovereign governments must give up their right to make independent decisions. The over-

all strategy may require one country to send to a beleaguered ally troops it would otherwise have kept for its own defense. One country may have to send guns and planes overseas to some crucial battle front, and then see its home forces suffer reverses for the lack of them. Similarly, it may have to yield raw materials needed for its own production program to an ally with a still more critical need. In the same way a nation like the United States, with a huge food production capacity, may have to go on short rations in order to export foodstuffs to allies who would otherwise starve.

Obviously, the way to handle these problems is through joint boards and commissions or, better still, through a single individual to whom the various states have delegated authority. The men who run such international agencies must carry a crushing burden of responsibility, for their decisions literally mean life and death for millions of people. Even if all the nations involved were willing to give them an absolutely free hand, their work would be complex enough. But it is made even more complex when certain states demand increased allotments of planes, tanks, food and so on, which seem to be out of line with the general interest, or when pressure groups within certain nations agitate for or against proposed measures. Agitation in Britain and America for a "second front" in the summer of 1942 was a case in point.

BRITISH-AMERICAN JOINT WAR PLANNING

In the field of military strategy no over-all United Nations agency has as yet been created, despite popular demand. But there are some fragmentary pieces of machinery in existence and they point the way to the kind of close, organized cooperation which most people believe the United Nations must have if they are to win the war.

First of all, there is American-British strategic collaboration. Soon after Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Churchill came to the United States to discuss the war situation with President Roosevelt, and the result was the creation of a *Combined Chiefs of Staff Organization*, with headquarters in Washington. The American representatives, naturally enough, are General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army; Lieutenant General Eisenhower, Commander of the U. S. Army forces in the European theater; Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet; Admiral Stark, Commander of the U. S. Naval forces in the European theater; and Lieutenant General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces. The five corresponding British members are General Sir John Dill, Admiral Cunningham, Major General Macready, Air Vice Marshall Evill, and Sir Henry Self.

The tasks of this organization are to decide upon plans for strategic operations, and to coordinate the activities of the field commanders in the various theatres of war. The plans must, of course, be approved by the political heads of the two governments. In view of the great personal interest both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill take in strategic matters, we can assume that they work closely with the C. C. S. O. Although the ranking military representatives of the other United Nations in Washington do not sit regularly with the American and British officers, they have been called into meetings for consultation whenever matters affecting their respective national interests were under discussion.

GETTING THE SPECIALISTS TOGETHER

Such an organization can work smoothly only if there is continuous cooperation between American and British specialists at lower levels of authority and responsibility. In


other words, the task of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Organization is made very much easier if American and British experts in the various military fields can reach agreements on many points before the over-all organization attempts to fit the pieces of the strategic puzzle together.

For this reason various subordinate joint agencies have been set up. Chief among these are the *Combined Staff Planners Committee* and the *Combined Intelligence Committee*. The former consists of the highest strategic planning officials of the United States War and Navy Departments, who have been detached from their respective departments and placed under the Combined Chiefs of Staff Organization where they can work together with similar British officials sent to Washington for the purpose. Each national group is termed a *Joint Strategic Committee*. Similarly, the *Combined Intelligence Committee* is composed of American and British *Joint Intelligence Committees*. In our own case, this last named committee includes representatives of other interested governmental agencies, such as the Board of Economic Warfare and the newly organized Office of Strategic Services (formerly a part of the organization of the now defunct Office of the Coordinator of Information).

FLAWS IN THE MACHINERY

On paper this organization seems impressive, and there is no doubt that its work is indispensable to the proper coordination of war planning. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that it has already achieved perfect coordination. In the first place, the other United Nations governments are not in all cases satisfied with the secondary advisory roles assigned to them. In the second place, liaison with London, not only with the political heads of the British government

JOINT PLANNING-STRATEGY



but with the supreme military commanders as well, is still a separate problem. Finally, there is the question of liaison with the field commanders whose advice is essential to the formation of any sound policy.

This question of liaison is now being tackled with some success. Many officers now fly frequently to and from the far-flung fields of battle to give the first-hand reports in the light of which final decisions must be made. Similarly, military men make many trips between New York and London in the service of those who must plan global strategy.

As the conflict has spread and theaters of operations have multiplied, the argument over centralization of policy as against the separation of the war into practically independent sectors has sharpened. The free expression of opinion in democratic countries has not made the problem any easier to solve. Many Americans have objected to sending lend-lease aid to other countries, such as China and Russia, when it meant giving away equipment which might have enabled us to concentrate enough military and naval power to drive the Japanese at once from the Aleutians. In the same way, Australia did not conceal her dissatisfaction with the concentration of final Empire strategic authority in London during the early days of the Pacific war.

THE PACIFIC THEATER

Great Britain tried to deal with the South Pacific aspect of the problem by creating a *Pacific War Council* in London. This step was sharply criticized in Canberra and Wellington, where there had long been objection to Prime Minister Churchill's repeated refusal to create an Imperial War Cabinet. Instead, Mr. Churchill appointed Mr. Richard Casey, Australian Minister in Washington, as Minister of State in the Middle

East, with headquarters in Cairo. This gesture, falling so far short of what Australia wanted, caused even greater resentment in Canberra. So after the United States entered the war, a second *Pacific War Council* was set up in Washington, on March 30, 1942. The members, in addition to the United States, are Australia, Canada, China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, the Philippines and New Zealand. Russia, anxious to postpone hostilities with Japan, has not established any official relationship with the Washington Pacific War Council, but we can assume that Ambassador Litvinoff gets full reports of all the proceedings and decisions.

We probably ought not to regard this Council as a supreme political body in actual control of military policy. Rather, the Council is an advisory body to which the strategists refer decisions with political implications, and which makes recommendations on general political issues relating to the conduct of the war in the Pacific area. As we might expect, it has developed into a working agency of far greater importance than the London Council. Although the latter continues to exist, it is no longer in any real sense a policy-forming agency.

UNIFYING COMMAND

It is not enough, however, for the heads of nations and their chief military advisers to agree upon high policy. It is equally necessary to coordinate all services at home and in the field in the execution of the policy after it has been agreed upon. Perfect coordination between the Army and the Navy of the United States is difficult enough to achieve. Imagine then the difficulty of lining up a United States naval task force, a Dutch submarine force, a British air force, and an Australian land force in a combined operation. A conflict of orders

might be fatal, and even a matter of bad timing might be a source of disaster.

TWO HEADS BETTER THAN ONE?

Asking the heads of the various forces to agree *voluntarily* on a coordinated plan of action in most circumstances simply does not work. Methods differ, and officers of one nationality are apt to resist suggestions and plans coming from commanders who serve under another flag. An article in *The New York Times* of August 3, 1942, graphically illustrated this problem.

"... For weeks [it stated] there has been considerable difference of opinion between the British and many high American Army officers about how our forces should operate in the British Isles. Many of our officers have taken the view that under no circumstances should American bombers be used until all our ground crews and service men were on the scene to service the craft and keep them operating, and that they should operate more or less independently of the Royal Air Force. Some other American officers opposed this view, on the ground that it would take valuable months before thousands of ground personnel could be transported across the Atlantic. They pointed out that this would result in valuable time being lost in bringing the full combined weight of the two air forces against the Germans, and that this weight could be most effective only if it were directed by a High Command which would represent both nations."

It is for this and countless similar reasons that a coalition of powers must sooner or later agree to set up a supreme authority over both strategy and supply planning. And when, as at present, they are sending their national forces to fight in many different theaters, they must also agree to unify the field command in each region.

WANTED—A COMMANDER IN CHIEF

The first problem has not as yet been solved. But there has been some progress in the direction of unifying the various regional commands. In the Southwest Pacific, for example, General MacArthur has been given supreme authority. He now controls all the Fighting French, Australian, British and American forces in that area. In organizing his executive, he placed an Australian general in command of the United Nations land forces, and American officers in charge of the air and naval forces. He also appointed Australian and Dutch officers to his staff, and, as we have already seen, a special Allied Supply Council was set up to allocate and distribute war supplies.

For various reasons, General MacArthur's area does not include China or even New Zealand. Chinese forces are, of course, under command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, but non-Chinese officers, such as our General Stilwell, have been serving with the Generalissimo. New Zealand comes under a South Pacific command headed by an American, Vice Admiral Ghormley, reporting to Admiral Nimitz. New Zealand has a military liaison officer in Australia and another in Washington. The latter serves also as a military adviser to Australian and New Zealand representatives on the Pacific War Council.

Other moves in the direction of unifying regional commands have been made. President Roosevelt recently placed the Alaskan region directly under the authority of the Navy Department, and it was announced at the same time that Canadian troops cooperating with American forces in this area would serve under the same authority. This is but one of many expressions of the close United States-Canadian cooperation projected by the Ogdensburg Agreement. This

Agreement provided among other things for the creation of a *Joint Defense Board* for the two countries. We should also mention the similar *United States-Mexican Joint Defense Board* and an *Inter-American Defense Board*. These organizations do what they can to coordinate the military activities of all the nations in this hemisphere which have severed relations with the Axis powers.

THE ROLE OF THE FIGHTING FRENCH

As for the Fighting French, the determination of the American government to avoid, if possible, an open break with the Vichy government of Marshal Petain has complicated efforts at collaboration. Thus we get a curiously contradictory situation. On the one hand, the United States has negotiated directly with Admiral Robert, the Vichy representative in Martinique, and, on the other, has voiced sharp disapproval over the Fighting French seizure of the Atlantic islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Recently, however, Admiral Stark, Commander of the European Naval Forces of the United States, and Brigadier General Bolte, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, European Headquarters, were authorized to represent the United States in all negotiations with General de Gaulle. This step, which amounted to appointing these officers as military and naval attachés accredited to the Fighting French National Committee, may usher in a period of increasingly close collaboration between the Fighting French and the United States.

In this haphazard way, the United Nations are groping toward a solution of the very difficult problem of unity of command and a more efficient planning of war strategy. Much remains to be done. But each step taken makes it easier for all concerned to take another and still another step, until

some final scheme has been perfected. To conduct a global war successfully, all concerned must cooperate fully and unreservedly. They must allow no considerations of national pride to block the appointment of the best men, whatever their nationality, to positions of authority over United Nations forces anywhere and everywhere in the world.

LAND, SEA AND AIR COMMANDS

One great obstacle to this centralization of authority is the fact that the national armed services of both Britain and the United States lack a supreme command. Indeed, it is quite probable that neither country *can* solve the problem of a United Nations command until it has succeeded in creating something approaching unity of command at home. Unified staff work, including a Chief of Staff with power over all branches of our armed forces, would relieve President Roosevelt of much of the responsibility for final strategic decisions, and it would pave the way for the needed international developments sketched above. In line with this idea, *The New York Times* recently (August 4, 1942) suggested editorially that if a Joint Chief of Staff could not be created without "unified control of the War and Navy Departments, then one man should be appointed as both Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy."

Once the United States and Britain have each set up a unified high command over their national armed forces, the next step will be to agree upon a Supreme High Command for each major theater of war, to which each of the participating nations will delegate final authority. The participants could do this independently if the United Nations have not, by that time, set up a Supreme War Council, or, if they have done so, the Council could confer the authority. It would be

most unfortunate if the United Nations were content merely to set up regional commands with inadequate authority, or if they delayed too long the creation of an over-all Supreme Command. The lessons of World War I in this last respect ought to be kept in mind.

IF THE GERMANS CAN DO IT, . . . !

It is generally agreed that one secret of the success of the German armed forces in the present war is the remarkable way in which the Nazis have unified authority over all branches of the armed services engaged in a particular strategic operation or area. The different service branches remain nominally independent, but the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich creates for a given operation or front a supreme command, with power to demand and control all units of all forces which are considered necessary for success. Of course, it is much easier to bring about this close-knit team work within the armed forces of a single country than within the ranks of a coalition of independent states, each of which allows its various armed services to keep their jealously guarded independence of one another. But somehow the job must be done. Victory is more important than tradition, more urgent than the maintenance of petty areas of authority. In military strategy, the United Nations must unite!



VI. When the Enemy Surrenders

Intergovernmental cooperation cannot stop when the foe sues for peace and an armistice brings the slaughter to a close. Indeed, it now appears that the need for close and continuous cooperation among the United Nations will be greater than ever after the war is won. The problems they will then face will be appalling in their size and complexity, and no one country or group of countries can undertake to solve them alone. To try to do so would be an invitation to disaster; it would be the most certain way to lose the peace.

COLLABORATION IN THE ARMISTICE PERIOD

If the enemy is forced to an unconditional surrender, we can take it for granted that the situation throughout Axis-dominated Europe will be near chaos. Once the heel of the conqueror is removed, the miserable subject peoples will rise as one man to exact vengeance for the sufferings they have endured. Within the Axis states, in all probability, bloody

revolts will strike down the governments which have led their peoples through endless trials to ultimate defeat.

If such a reign of terror throughout Western and Central Europe is to be checked, the United Nations must plan ahead of time so as to be ready to intervene quickly to restore order and establish stable ruling institutions. They can do this only by using sizable forces of occupation which will maintain public order and safety pending the establishment or re-establishment of satisfactory governments. We can grasp the magnitude of this task only if we explore the problem in some detail.

WHO WILL TAKE OVER IN THE LIBERATED STATES?

Most of the occupied countries now have governments in London which are recognized by the other United Nations as the legal authorities of the states in question. These governments will want to return to their capitals and re-establish themselves as soon as possible after the fighting ends. In some cases (Norway and the Netherlands are examples), the government's return is likely to meet with such popular acclaim that the other United Nations will scarcely need to intervene to keep order. In certain other liberated states, however, the people may not be inclined to welcome back into power the political leaders who left the country at the time of the Nazi invasion. They may, in fact, resist the returning government. The longer the war continues, the greater may be the possibility of this resistance and resulting civil disorder.

This is obviously a problem requiring the most delicate handling. If the United Nations do nothing to assist the returning government in reasserting its authority, there may be civil war between the partisans of the returning govern-

ment and those supporting a new leader or clique of leaders who, having led an underground anti-Axis organization during the occupation period, now feel that they have earned the right to establish a lawful government. If, on the other hand, the United Nations give full military support to the returning government, they may help to create an unhealthy state of affairs, because that government may lack genuine popular support. Above all, the United Nations must avoid a situation in which, because they lack a common program, individual victor governments give support to the claims of rival factions in these liberated states. Whether the United Nations themselves take over full authority until the liberated peoples can declare their will, or whether they support the returning governments, they will still need to act according to some common plan. This plan ought to be drawn up well in advance.

THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING ORDER

Suppose that the situation, say in Poland, demands active military intervention to restore order and to govern the country until a satisfactory and stable Polish government can be established. Should the occupying force here be international in its make-up, with representatives from many or all of the United Nations, or should it be a detachment of troops of a single great power such as the United States or the Soviet Union? If it is the first, there will be difficulties in organizing the command and administration. If it is the second, the other victor states may suspect the occupying state of using its vast power to advance its own national interests, even perhaps to the point of supporting an undesirable puppet regime in Poland just because it promised to favor those interests.

THE DEFEATED STATES

Within the defeated states similar problems will arise. If the present governments are overthrown at the end of the war, United Nations forces will probably have to occupy the entire territory of the Axis states in order to forestall complete political and economic collapse. They will also have to see that Axis armies are demobilized, and war equipment, frontier fortifications and the like surrendered or destroyed according to schedule.

This military occupation of the Axis states will present plenty of tough problems in administration. To solve these problems the victor governments will have to collaborate closely and wholeheartedly. If the countries are divided into zones, and each zone is placed under the control of the occupying forces of a single national army, ten to one the same difficulties that beset the Rhineland occupation after 1919 will develop. If joint forces are used, the method of organizing authority is likely to be a bone of contention. Either way, the difficulties will be more easily overcome if the United Nations have reached an agreement before the shooting stops.

ORGANIZATION FOR FOOD AND RELIEF

Although there will be a compelling need for cooperation in order to restore and maintain public order throughout the Nazi-dominated lands, even more urgent will be the relief of human suffering. Food in immense quantities must be sent at once to the starving peoples whose lands have been so ruthlessly and so systematically stripped by the Nazi looters. Milk and fresh fruits and vitamin capsules must be rushed to children whose only acquaintance with life has been one of unending hunger and fear. Medicines must be pro-

vided, and strict sanitary regulations enforced. Otherwise, pestilence will sweep over Europe and bring death to millions of persons whose natural resistance to disease has been weakened by months, if not years, of malnutrition and other extreme physical hardships. The present world must be saved before a new one can be built.

RESTORING THE "SCORCHED EARTH"

Together with this vast emergency relief effort, there must be a secondary type of relief of almost equal urgency. Seed grains must be distributed, and breeding animals must be imported to replace those which the people have slaughtered either for food or because fodder was no longer available. Similarly there must be shipments of draft animals and agricultural implements and a hundred other things which desperate and destitute people will need in order to start life once more. This help to the needy will be a final assurance to all men that the United Nations have been sincere in declaring that they have fought for the four freedoms the world over.

Needless to say, such a gigantic task will require an organized international effort. Food and supplies must be collected, transported over great distances, and distributed efficiently and quickly and with justice to all. Private or semi-public agencies, such as the Red Cross, which have admirable records of past performance in these fields, can do much to aid in this work, but the job cannot be turned over exclusively to them; it is so vast that only direct governmental agencies can hope to deal adequately with it. Already, as we saw in Chapter IV, the governments of some of the United Nations have given thought to the matter, and have set about accumulating food reserves for distribution as soon as the fighting is

over. When that time comes, the victors must be ready at once to tackle this—the greatest relief problem in history—with a fully competent organization.

RESETTLING UPROOTED PEOPLE

The relief problem is not limited, however, to supplying food and medicines and the means of rehabilitation for farmers. Millions of people have been uprooted from their homes and forcibly moved to distant regions. Some have gone voluntarily, fleeing from the approaching inferno of war. Some in the occupied areas have been shifted by the "master race" to great industrial centers where they have had to labor in factories that were turning out war materials for the Nazi armies. Others, like the hapless Jews, have been exiled to concentration areas where their lives have been deliberately made intolerable. Still others have been moved like pawns in a chess game, because a dictator ruled that they should live in the land of their supposed forebears. Whatever the reasons for their removal from their home districts, vast numbers of persons will seek the first opportunity after the war to return and settle once more in their accustomed lands.

These people will need assistance both for transportation and for resettlement. Medical authorities must carefully supervise their return so that they may not be carriers of disease. Where they are to be resettled on lands which have been the scene of active warfare, the "scorched earth" policy applied by retreating armies will have destroyed almost the last vestiges of buildings, roads, and bridges. The returning settlers will need vast supplies of building materials and the like, in addition to the food, seeds, animals and tools we mentioned above. All this will require international organization on a large scale—probably in the form of technical com-

missions with extensive funds and wide authority—and a willingness to sacrifice for the common good.

AFTER THE ARMISTICE PERIOD

Once the enemy has been disarmed and the starving and disease-ridden peoples have been provided with a new start in life, the need for international organization will not end. Rather, it will be just beginning.

First of all, there is the all-important matter of treaty arrangements to prevent further aggression by the Axis states. The peace settlements will undoubtedly impose many restrictions designed, either directly or indirectly, to keep the defeated powers from plunging the world again into war. The armies of these powers will be disbanded, their military equipment destroyed or surrendered, and they will be forbidden to maintain a future army or to manufacture or import dangerous implements of war. To write such requirements into treaties is not the same as enforcing them, of course, and it is doubtful if the United Nations will maintain permanent armies of occupation for the purpose of enforcing them. Just as long as armies of occupation *are* maintained, however, there must be careful international arrangements, in order to prevent national units from being used to advance selfish national policies.

TO GUARD AGAINST AGGRESSION

This time, and with the lessons of Versailles well in mind, the treaty-makers may decide to close all loopholes for evading the arms limitation requirements of the new treaty. They may set up a system of inspection in those industries which could be used for the manufacture of arms and other prohibited military equipment. This is by no means a new

idea. During the long discussions about arms limitation at Geneva a decade ago, the delegates were generally agreed that such a system of inspection for the industrial plants of all parties concerned must clinch any future arms limitation agreements. If such a plan should go through for dealing with the Axis powers, a body of trained men representing the organized United Nations would be needed to carry it out. If these men reported merely to each of the victor governments, and if those governments then had to arrange a special meeting to consider and act upon unsatisfactory reports, it is very doubtful if the system would work.

Enforcing peace, however, means something more than disarming the Axis. Not many people believe that the United Nations could or should try to keep the Axis powers in a state of perpetual subjection. At some time in the future when, we hope, the peoples of Germany, Japan and Italy will have undergone a successful re-education, these states will again be permitted to play a full and equal part in all international affairs. In the meantime, the United Nations must be busy building solid foundations for the future organization of peace.

THE OUTLINES OF THE COMING PEACE

We cannot discuss these foundations in any detail now because there is no general agreement among the United Nations as yet on the blueprint of the peace structure to be built. Certain architectural features, however, have been mentioned in high official utterances, and these we can touch on briefly.

First of all, there must be some machinery for preventing or repressing future aggression. People generally agree that the present war has shown how impossible it is to maintain peace solely through neutrality policies backed by extensive

national military establishments. The alternative is some form of international organization for immediate and concerted action whenever and wherever a threat to peace appears. This international organization may be regional or worldwide; it may be universal as to membership, or it may be limited; but whatever its form and extent, it will rest on the fundamental principle of collective security. No matter whether the plan adopted is one of an international police force, along with extensive national disarmament, or whether it is limited to agreement on plans for joint action against any future danger, the principle of intergovernmental collaboration on an organized basis inevitably comes into play.

This is clearly the line of official thinking. Secretary Hull, in his broadcast speech of July 23, 1942, said, "It is evident that some international agency must be created which can—by force, if necessary—keep the peace among nations in the future. There must be international cooperative action to set up the mechanisms which can thus insure peace." Even more precise was Under Secretary Welles' reference (in his Memorial Day speech at Arlington) to his belief that the peoples of the anti-Axis nations "will insist that the United Nations undertake the maintenance of an international police power in the years after the war to insure freedom from fear to peace-loving peoples until there is established that permanent system of general security promised by the Atlantic Charter."

COOPERATIVE POLITICS

Cooperation cannot be limited to security measures alone. There must be political authority to define the nature of any general security agency, however limited in scope and activity. Only the collaboration of the United Nations, and of such

other states as may join in the great task, can create and maintain such authority. This authority may be embodied in a revived and revitalized League of Nations, or it may be entrusted to an entirely new international organization, based, in the beginning at least, upon the United Nations concept. But whatever its form, the principle of political cooperation through permanently organized international institutions is indispensable for the future of world peace.



VII. Toward a People's Peace

When they signed the Joint Declaration of January 1942, the United Nations pledged themselves to support the "common program of purposes and principles" set forth in the Roosevelt-Churchill manifesto of August 14, 1941. Because the heads of the two great democracies bordering on the Atlantic drafted this document, and agreed to it at a shipboard conference held in that ocean, it became known as the *Atlantic Charter*. In one sense, this was unfortunate, since it seemed to exclude other parts of the world. Now that the flood of fascist aggression has engulfed freedom-loving peoples everywhere—peoples of every creed and color—what is really needed is a *world charter*.

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND A PEOPLE'S PEACE

Fortunately the Atlantic Charter, if interpreted liberally, can be widely applied. With this in mind, President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and other American statesmen have tried in their public speeches to assure China, India and the dependent

peoples of the Middle and Far East that the United Nations are fighting as much in their interest as for the survival of freedom in the Western world.

The Eight Points of the Atlantic Charter fall into three groups. The first group (Points 1-3) deals with the political and territorial phases of the postwar settlement; the second (Points 4-5) is concerned mainly with social and economic objectives; while the third (Points 6-8) tackles the problem of international security. Let us examine briefly each of these groups.

THE POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT

No peace aim could stand in sharper contrast to the Axis program of enslavement than Point 1 of the Atlantic Charter. Point 2, however, recognizes that territorial *adjustments*, as opposed to territorial *aggrandizement*, may be desirable, but they must accord "with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." This means that the prewar picture need not necessarily be restored in every particular. The status of many dependent areas, including the colonial empires of some of the United Nations, of France, and possibly of such "neutral" states as Spain and Portugal, will undergo profound changes. And nothing is surer than that Japan and Italy will not regain full sovereignty over their colonies.

In Europe there will have to be certain territorial rearrangements for which no blueprint can be drawn at this stage. Much will depend upon the kind of postwar organization that is set up for the Continent as a whole. At best, the mapmakers of the new Europe will have no easy time. Settling the permanent frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia, of Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, will be a major headache. The British and the Russians, among others, will probably

ATLANTIC CHARTER



FIRST: no aggrandizement, territorial or other



SECOND: no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned



THIRD: the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.



FOURTH: enjoyment by all states --- of access --- to the trade and to the raw materials of the world



FIFTH: for all, improved labor standards, economic adjustment and social security



SIXTH: to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries



SEVENTH: all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance



EIGHTH: the abandonment of the use of force

differ widely on the question of what boundaries should be set for a defeated Germany. In the interest of Russian security, the Soviet Union has from time to time hinted that it expected to keep those portions of Finnish territory which it acquired through the Russo-Finnish War of 1940. It has also intimated that it would not care to allow the tiny Baltic States of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania to regain their independence. The Mutual Assistance Agreement concluded by the Soviet Union and Great Britain on May 26, 1942 may, however, have allayed Russian fears. In this Agreement the two powers state that "they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states." A real system of collective security would also go a long way toward reassuring the Soviet Union.

"SELF-DETERMINATION"—BUT HOW?

How to obtain the consent of peoples affected by shifts of political jurisdiction is a baffling problem. After the last war, plebiscites were held in contested border areas, but they were not particularly successful. In some cases, it may be possible this time to shift "minority" populations across national lines. But unless this is done on a voluntary basis, it will hardly square with Point 2 of the Atlantic Charter. Forced migrations would smack too much of the Hitler technique.

Regional arrangements in Europe making it easier for goods, people, and ideas to cross frontiers may offer one way out of this dilemma. To the extent that boundaries lose their character as economic and cultural barriers, they will tend to become merely administrative devices, much like the lines which separate the forty-eight states of the American Federal Union.

It will be equally difficult to realize Point 3 of the Charter, which promises all peoples the right "to choose the form of government under which they will live" and pledges the restoration of "sovereign rights and self-government" to "those who have been forcibly deprived of them." These are thoroughly democratic ideals, but in applying them to a continent which may be wracked by revolution and chaos after the war, the United Nations will have no easy task. There is no certainty that in the near future liberal governments can be set up and maintained in Central and Eastern Europe. How, for example, translate the right of "self-government" into reality, unless there are stable groups of leaders around whom to rebuild the political life of the conquered countries? It is not unlikely that the victor powers will have to occupy certain areas for a considerable time before political conditions settle down into some sort of stability.

MODIFYING THE CONCEPT OF STATEHOOD

The phrase "sovereign rights" raises a further question of great importance. Taken literally, this phrase would imply that every European national group could and should return to unrestricted statehood. Yet this is hardly what the authors of the Charter had in mind, since it was the conflict of unlimited national sovereignties that paved the way for the present world catastrophe. Restoring the old states' system, moreover, would certainly not make it easy for the nations to collaborate in the economic field, or achieve "freedom from fear," as set forth in a later provision of the Charter itself.

If postwar reconstruction is to succeed, the victor powers will have to devise and maintain a system of international

cooperation in which the member states will inevitably have to surrender part of their individual sovereignty. Only if this is done will it be possible for national groups living in a world scrambled by science and technology to enjoy the blessings of liberty and peace.

"FREEDOM FROM WANT"

Points 4 and 5 of the Atlantic Charter bring us to the economic problem. No one will object to the basic purposes of these declarations. Once again, however, we must recognize that they can at best be realized only gradually, and only if international arrangements succeed in checking economic nationalism. National states, for example, can no longer be allowed to alter their tariff and currency policies at will, without regard to the larger international interest.

If "freedom from want" is to have any real meaning for the people of the world, there must also be some way of co-ordinating in an international plan national programs for preventing unemployment and raising living standards. This is the long-term problem of economic rehabilitation which will face the United Nations after the period of emergency relief we mentioned in the last chapter is over. It will call for international action to make possible emigration and resettlement schemes, shipments of raw materials, seeds, animals, tools and industrial machinery when and where they are most needed, perhaps international public works. There will probably have to be a priority system to decide which national needs take precedence over others. This in turn may require continued international control of shipping. How will impoverished states pay for the materials and tools and services they need? Will an international bank be set up, and on what system will it operate? It seems obvious that the sur-

plus capital of countries like the United States should be used for developing backward regions productively. But a cooperative world must see that lender governments do not exploit their debtors, and at the same time offer reasonable assurance that the borrowers will not repudiate their foreign loans for political reasons. These and many other kindred hurdles will have to be overcome.

IF FOR WAR, WHY NOT FOR PEACE?

This is a large order, indeed. Countries with such divergent economic systems and geographic circumstances as Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States will have to summon up the utmost patience and understanding if they are to work together fruitfully in the economic field. All nations must subordinate selfish domestic interests to the common welfare of the world's peoples. But if such sacrifices can be made, as they *are* being made, for the purpose of waging war, and if orthodox international financing can give way in a time of crisis to the credo of "from each according to ability to pay," then certainly equally tremendous sacrifices and changes in thinking can be made for peace. The will to achieve the goal, whatever the cost, is the most important thing.

"FREEDOM FROM FEAR"

With "freedom from want," the Atlantic Charter couples "freedom from fear." This means the establishment of a system of international security not only for protection against unprovoked aggression, but also to make it possible in the long run for all states to reduce armaments down to a police level. This is the essence of Points 6, 7, and 8. First of all must come the complete "destruction of the Nazi

tyranny," and, of course, we can now add, the complete overthrow of the Japanese war lords. Once the Nazi and Nipponese war machines are dismantled, the major victor powers are to take responsibility for maintaining world order, "pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security." This means that they must be able to agree upon some cooperative plan for policing critical areas, not only in Europe, but possibly in Asia and the Western Pacific as well. As a part of this plan, the United States, the British Commonwealth and perhaps Russia and China will doubtless share control of certain key points around the globe, while contingents of United Nations air and land forces are stationed wherever disorder threatens. At the same time, their naval power can be used to keep the sea lanes open to peaceful trade and travel (Point 7).

DISARM THE AGGRESSORS FIRST

One important fact seems clear: the United Nations do not hold out to their enemies the promise that the victors will themselves disarm by some specified date or down to any fixed level, as the Allied and Associated Powers did in 1919. This time, general security is to come first, and only later a general reduction of armaments. According to Point 8 of the Charter, "abandonment of the use of force" is an ideal to work toward "for realistic as well as spiritual reasons." But the Charter looks toward no immediate transformation in the behavior of the aggressor nations. There must be a sufficiently long testing period, during which the "war potential" of Germany, Japan, and Italy will be internationally controlled, before the United Nations, *provided they remain united*, are likely to accept "equality" of disarmament. They mean to take no chances.

WHAT KIND OF WORLD GOVERNMENT?

As to the structural character of the system of general security which is eventually to be set up, the text of the Atlantic Charter gives us no inkling. Conceivably, this might consist of a single, *world-wide* organization backed by economic and military force, or it could perhaps be developed by interlocking a number of *regional* systems, centering in Pan America, Europe, the Pacific and the Middle East.

Whether a unified international police force can be created it is too early to say. For a considerable period at least, the chances are that cooperative arrangements among national navies and national air forces will be as far as the powers are able to move in the direction of collective defense. In any case, there can be no international police force until there is a complete international government. Until you have given a state some other means of getting justice, you can't take the right to use force away from it, any more than you can take the right to use force away from an individual without establishing the alternative of an elected legislature and courts of law. People, moreover, are apt to think of police as being for the other fellow. But every state which subscribes to the idea of an international police force must realize that it itself may some day be disciplined by that force, and must be prepared to accept such discipline.

THE POSTWAR IMPLICATIONS OF THE MASTER LEND-LEASE AGREEMENTS

Since the Atlantic Charter was written, pairs or larger groups of states belonging to the family of United Nations have entered into a considerable number of agreements of a more binding character. Some of these wartime pacts have long-range implications of the highest importance.

In the economic sphere, the Master Lend-Lease Agreements, which we mentioned in Chapter 4, are acts of creative statesmanship. Under each of these agreements, now concluded with all three of our major allies and most of the lesser ones, this country pledges, as we have seen, that the conditions of repayment for materials and equipment furnished to the other party shall be such "as to promote the betterment of world-wide economic relations." To that end, the governments concerned agree to take appropriate domestic and international measures to expand production, employment, and the consumption of goods, as well as to eliminate "all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce" and reduce "tariff and other trade barriers." Lend-lease, originally forged as a weapon of war, can thus serve as a weapon for winning the peace. If used with a will, it can wipe out the spectre of a future "war debts" squabble, and lay the foundation for a fair and full sharing of the world's resources. As the overwhelmingly strongest creditor nation, the United States will have the power to lay the corner-stone and start the building—provided it ceases to worship at the altar of high protectionism.

THE ANGLO-SOVIET MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT

There are no greater post-war potentialities actually on paper than in the recent Treaty of Mutual Assistance negotiated by Great Britain and the Soviet Union. For many years before June 22, 1941, these two powers had distrusted each other. In fact, their distrust had much to do with the collapse of the League and the fateful breakdown in the Anglo-French negotiations with Moscow in the summer of 1939. If the spirit as well as the letter of the recent treaty is kept, it will open a new and hopeful chapter in European politics.

and make effective United Nations collaboration much more feasible.

In addition to undertaking not to make a separate peace with Hitler's Germany, the two countries now officially propose to work together for the building of a peaceful order in Europe. For a period of twenty years, they agree "to take all measures in their power" to ban aggression. In case either country should be threatened with attack, the other will come to its assistance. Each state also promises "not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against the other." More significant still is the provision in the treaty which declares that each government desires "*to unite with other likeminded states* in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period" (italics ours). This gives us ground for hope that we can count on Anglo-Soviet cooperation when the time comes to make plans for a permanent international organization under United Nations auspices.

CAPITALISTS AND COMMUNISTS CAN COOPERATE

Another article of the treaty provides that the two powers shall "render one another all possible economic assistance after the war." Although at first glance it may seem paradoxical that a capitalist and a communist power can work together in the economic field, Russia will be in such urgent need of food, clothing and industrial equipment for the rebuilding of her economy that she will have to turn to her Western allies—Britain and the United States—to supply these needs. Thus the Russian market should become an important outlet for British and American goods. Russia will need substantial credits, to be sure, chiefly from the United States, but in a secure and cooperative world extending credits should be

feasible and fruitful for both the lender and the borrower.

It is generally believed that President Roosevelt's influence with both London and Moscow helped a great deal in pushing the Anglo-Soviet Treaty through. Foreign Minister Molotoff's visit to Washington in June 1942 gave the President a chance to use his diplomatic skill in persuading the Russians not to press their alleged demand for a British guarantee of Russia's western frontiers—at the expense of Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, and Rumania, Washington appears to have insisted that such a guarantee would be contrary to the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. Perhaps as the other half of the bargain, the United States agreed to declare war on Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, and gave assurance that it recognized the urgency of opening a second front in Europe. On the eve of Molotoff's departure from Washington, the White House released a statement in this general vein.

OTHER WARTIME AGREEMENTS AMONG THE EUROPEAN ALLIES

Certain other agreements have been concluded by European members of the United Nations family. Two of these agreements concern the postwar status of Poland. By the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 30, 1941, the U.S.S.R. "recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity." In other words, Russia assured Poland that she did not intend to claim that part of Poland occupied by Soviet troops in September 1939—seeing that the two countries had become allies in a common struggle against Nazi Germany. Again, in a joint statement dated December 4, 1941, Russia and Poland declared their intention of basing their peacetime relations on "good neighborly col-

laboration, friendship, and mutually honest observance of the undertakings they have assumed." This declaration goes even further. It expresses the belief that a durable and just peace can be achieved only "through a new organization of international relations" based on "respect for international law" and "backed by the collective armed force of all the Allied States." We should note, too, that the text of this declaration proposes a "unification of the *democratic* countries in a durable alliance" (italics ours).

POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The legal Polish and Czechoslovak governments have also signed agreements (November 1940 and January 1942) affecting postwar Europe. They foreshadow the creation of a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation as a possible nucleus for a larger Central European union. Although the scheme outlined for this confederation is not a detailed blueprint, it binds the two countries to coordinate their defense, economic, financial, and social policies, to create a joint general staff, and to give their citizens a common constitutional guarantee of civil liberties. Other states in Europe are invited to join the proposed confederation.

GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

An agreement similar in purpose but much more explicit in its terms was negotiated on January 15, 1942, by the Greek and Yugoslav legal governments. This document provided for the creation of "union" organs to deal with matters of foreign, economic, and financial policy, and to unify the administration of defense. There were to be joint meetings of parliamentary delegations from the two countries at periodic intervals for an exchange of views on common problems.

Like the Polish-Czech agreements, this Greco-Yugoslav Union invites other Balkan states to join, in the hope that it may serve as the beginning of a larger regional federation.

At the meeting of the International Labor Organization in New York in November 1941, the government, employer, and worker delegates from these four Central European and Balkan countries announced that they intended to collaborate for the improvement of living standards among the 100,000,000 industrial workers and peasants in that part of Europe. The following January, they formed a Central and Eastern European Planning Board. With provisional headquarters in New York, the Board is now actively at work preparing plans for the reconstruction of the entire region.

COMMITMENTS AFFECTING DEPENDENT PEOPLES

By an ironic twist of fate, the first sovereign to lose his throne through Axis aggression was the first to regain it through Allied action in this war. In January 1942, shortly after Allied troops succeeded in wresting Ethiopia from the Italian invader, London announced an agreement with Emperor Haile Selassie restoring him to full sovereignty and promising economic assistance to the government of Ethiopia. Details of this pact have not been made public, but it is believed that the Emperor in turn agreed to retain British advisers for the native Ethiopian army, and to give the United Nations forces the right to use Ethiopian bases and communications facilities.

Great Britain and the Soviet Union made a somewhat similar agreement with the government of Iran soon after the joint Anglo-Russian occupation of Iranian territory. According to *The New York Times* of January 30, 1942, the main purpose of this agreement was to ensure to the Allied

powers, "for the passage of troops or supplies, the unrestricted right to use, maintain, guard and, in certain circumstances, to control all means of communications throughout Iran and to furnish all possible assistance and facilities in obtaining material and labor." All forces belonging to the two Allies were to be withdrawn, however, within six months after the close of hostilities. Acting in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, moreover, the two Allied governments further agreed to respect "the strict independence and integrity of Persia" once victory over Germany was achieved, and "to do their best to safeguard as far as possible the economic existence of the Iranian people against economic privations and difficulties as a result of the present war."

In addition to all these undertakings, we should also mention a declaration issued by the Dutch government about the future status of the Netherlands East Indies. This pronouncement assured the Indies of "an autonomous regime" after the war, under the "protection" of Holland.

SELF-LIQUIDATING IMPERIALISM?

The consistent thread running through these various commitments is the Allies' declaration of intention to renounce imperialistic advantage for themselves in their treatment of dependent peoples after the war. America's long-standing pledge of complete independence for the Philippines will have its effect on the policy of Britain and Holland toward their own Far Eastern possessions, now occupied by Japanese forces. What President Quezon said in a broadcast of August 9, 1942 on the meaning of the Atlantic Charter is worth quoting here: "It is a charter for Europe and for America, and—let us be clear on this—it is a charter of freedom for the peoples of Asia and all the Far East."

The real problem facing the United Nations when peace comes will be how to translate this pledge of freedom into terms which will not only advance the economic welfare of native peoples and hasten their preparation for self-government, but also safeguard the legitimate interests of the world as a whole. Bound up with these interests is the right of the more advanced nations to carry on trade with dependent areas and to utilize their raw materials under conditions of equal opportunity for all comers. Modern warfare also makes it imperative that strategic bases and waterways, located within dependent territories, be brought under effective international control, so that they may not be used to jeopardize the security of peace-loving nations.*

THE UNION MUST BE PRESERVED!

The battle for peace after the bombs cease to fall will tax to the utmost the collective will, intelligence, and courage of the United Nations. Peacemaking is a never-ending process. No sharp line will divide the war and postwar periods. The fighting may not stop at the same time in all parts of the world. Nazi resistance in Europe may be crushed long before the Japanese are forced to yield in the Far East—or vice versa. During this twilight zone between “official” war and “declared” peace, there will be all too many opportunities for misunderstanding, suspicion and rivalry to loosen the bonds that held the United Nations together when they faced a common enemy. We have only to remember the tragic experience of twenty years ago to realize what a blow to our hopes it would be if this were allowed to happen again. The victory of 1943 or 1944 or 1945, depending on how

*The Indian problem has purposely been excluded from the scope of this Headline Book. Insofar as is publicly known, there have been no *United Nations* commitments regarding the future of India.

long it takes to defeat the Axis, can easily be frittered away like the victory of 1918.

The contours of a peace settlement are largely determined by the nature of the war it follows. It is of vital importance, therefore, that the wartime comradeship of the United Nations be built on foundations that will not crumble as soon as the enemy surrenders. Thus far, despite the impressive array of joint boards, commissions, and councils now functioning in Washington, no fully rounded organization representing all the twenty-nine United Nations has come into being. As we saw earlier in this Headline Book, most of the formal machinery of cooperation is still confined to Anglo-American and Western Hemisphere relationships. There is still lacking any over-all political agency for the planning of the grand strategy of the war, let alone the peace. At this stage, such a situation may in part be inevitable, but it is nonetheless unfortunate if, as Sumner Welles urged in his Memorial Day address at Arlington, the United Nations are to provide "the nucleus of a world organization of the future to determine the final terms of a just, an honest and a durable peace."

DEEDS, NOT WORDS, DEMONSTRATE UNITY

Not only among the lesser members of the United Nations coalition, but also among millions of Far Eastern peoples who aspire for freedom from alien control, there lingers the fear that the English-speaking nations may end by "policing" and "subsidizing" the world to their own advantage. Axis propaganda has not hesitated to play upon this theme. Nor has loose talk about the coming "American century," in which some of our own publicists have indulged, helped to allay this suspicion.

Works, not words, will prove the sincerity of our belief in the "Four Freedoms." The United Nations, as a living symbol of the free world order that we seek to establish, still mean all too little to the embattled Chinese and the enslaved peoples of Nazi-dominated Europe; and much remains to be done before the Soviet Union and the Western democracies can be said to have discovered a genuine basis for collaboration in building "a people's peace."

There are many who feel that the peace aims embodied in the Atlantic Charter have not stirred the imagination of men in the magnificent way that Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" served the cause of the Allies in World War I. The price of victory this time may be a militant propaganda which will emphasize our determination to make democracy serve "the common man," irrespective of nationality, color, creed or economic class. Powerful forces of social change are on the march around the world. The leadership of the United Nations must channel these forces into a unified dynamic movement, working toward a cooperative world system based upon racial and religious tolerance, economic justice and the dignity of the individual. In place of Hitler's "new order," *Gestapo*-controlled, we must be prepared to offer a *better* order run by *free* men.



VIII. America's Second Chance

At best, the road leading to this goal will be long and tortuous. Yet no people have a greater incentive to struggle towards it than the people of the United States.

The deadly impact of the present conflict has struck America with a jolt little imagined even by our most ardent pre-Pearl Harbor interventionists. The last illusion of security based upon the accidents of geography ought by now to have been completely shattered. Instead of going to the aid of freedom-loving peoples overseas, we now find we have to depend in part upon their military resources for our own national safety. Many people do not know that we have had the assistance of British naval units in the terrific battle against the Nazi submarine off our Atlantic Coast and in the Caribbean. Australian, New Zealand and Dutch forces are fighting side by side with our own sailors, marines and airmen in the vast stretches of the Western Pacific. The valiant pilots of the R.A.F. rain their devastating blows upon

the German submarine bases and aircraft factories which send out the weapons of destruction that sink our oil tankers and may bomb the great cities along our Atlantic seaboard. The courageous Russian and Chinese armies are as truly fighting our battle as their own.

ONE WORLD—ONE WAR

This war is all of one piece. Yet for two years after it began, most of our politicians, regardless of party, were promising American parents that their boys would never again be sent to fight in "foreign wars." Today, thousands of these boys are to be found in a hundred remote places around the globe—places whose names we had never even heard of before the announcement that our boys had safely arrived at their destinations. Such are the tempo and the scale of a war fought to prevent the enslavement of the world by fanatical barbarians who will stop at nothing.

THE NEW OPPORTUNITY

Once again, when victory is finally won, opportunity will knock at America's door. Two decades ago we cast aside a similar opportunity. Today we are paying a heavy price for failing to take up the international responsibilities which should then have been ours. This time these responsibilities will be infinitely greater. Although much will depend on how long the war lasts, the United States has a better prospect than the other major powers of emerging from the years of war with its material and human resources substantially intact. If only in its own interest, it will be compelled to take the initiative in restoring orderly processes of economic and social life *outside* as well as *within* the American hemisphere. Even more, it will have a vital stake in building and

supporting the international institutions which alone can make a just and honest peace secure.

WORKING TOGETHER

Nothing is clearer than that we cannot do all this by ourselves—or by merely wishing it. A postwar foreign policy cast in a semi-isolationist mould would prove just as dangerous as the confused course we followed from 1919 to 1939. American public opinion must not forget the lessons it is learning today under the impact of Japanese aggression. It must build up a constructive internationalism to meet the needs of tomorrow. Signs are not wanting, alas! that many of our former spokesmen for isolationism are merely biding their time, waiting for the first chance to emerge from cover adorned with slightly different labels but preaching the same doctrine. Unless an aroused citizenry thwarts their plans, this nation may once again fail to seize its "time for greatness."

SIGN UP FOR PEACE NOW

One of the best ways we can guard against a relapse into isolationism when the time of immediate danger is past is to make as many commitments as possible now to collaborate with others of the United Nations in the postwar period. This would help to hold all the nations together in the period of let-down and confusion which will be the first aftermath of the war. It would have the added advantage of assuring the other United Nations that this time the American people mean to see things through.

The job can be done if we will but revive within ourselves that pioneering spirit which enabled our forefathers to conquer a wilderness and build a great civilization on this continent. Our frontiers are now as wide as the globe itself, and

no less challenging than those of yesterday. Our national destiny is inexorably bound up, for better or for worse, with that of the rest of the world. The call today is for pioneers who can shape that interdependence into a permanent blessing, instead of a recurrent curse.

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"To sum up, we believe that the most vital demands to be made by the Church with a view to social reconstruction are two: The restoration of man's economic activity to its proper place as the servant of his whole personal life; and the expression of his status in the natural world as a child of God for whom Christ died.

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"The resources of the earth should be used as God's gifts to the whole human race, and used with due consideration for the needs of the present and future generations."

—Malvern Conference, 1941

The second Study Packet to be produced by the Congregational Christian Study of World Organization will deal with the economic problems of postwar reconstruction. It will include among other items: *Uniting Today for Tomorrow*, *Faith for Reconstruction*, by Rose Terlin, and *After the War—Full Employment*, by Alvin Hansen. Price of the packet is 35¢.

